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Abstract
During the 15 years prior to the global financial crisis the volume of secu-
ritized assets transacted in the US grew substantially, reflecting a change in
the nature of the financial intermediation process. Together with increased
securitization of assets, financial entities, who participate more heavily in the
asset-backed security (ABS) market and hold a diversified portfolio of assets,
have also become more relevant. As a result, the volume of securitization, al-
though traditionally associated with credit markets, influences the outcomes
of other asset markets. We investigate the link between securitization and
asset prices and show that increases in the growth rate of the volume of ABS
issuance lead to a decline in both the bond and equity premia. We then build
a model of bank portfolio choice where the creation of synthetic securities may
occur. The pooling and tranching of credit assets relaxes both the funding and
the risk constraints financial entities face allowing them to increase balance
sheet holdings. This increase in asset demand depresses the compensation for
undertaking risk in the economy, confirming our empirical results. Crucially,
we show that declines in the compensation for risk taking in equity and bonds
due to securitization may not be related to a decline in actual risk.
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1. Introduction
The volume of securitized assets traded in the US has grown remarkably from the
beginning of the 1990s until the onset of the global financial crisis, when it collapsed.
Figure 1 shows the monthly volume of issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS),
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and their sum (all) from January 1993 until De-
cember 2010. Such volumes have been determinant in shaping the development of
the financial markets and particularly financial intermediation, motivating several
studies to analyze their effects on credit issuance and standards, focusing particularly
on mortgage markets. The general message is that mortgage securitization increases
loan supply and lowers aggregate price of credit. Although securitization has tra-
ditionally been higher in the mortgage market, our data shows that the issuance of
ABS matches the issuance of MBS in the beginning of the 2000’s. Furthermore,
the participants in the market of asset-backed securities are financial entities, com-
prising of financial companies and funding corporations, sometimes referred to as
shadow banks, who hold a more diverse portfolio than commercial banks. As a
result, due to potential portfolio effects, those high volumes of securitization might
affect other asset classes. The focus of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the
effects of securitization on bond and equity markets.
Figure 1: Volume of Securitization - US
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We first conduct an empirical analysis that looks at the dynamic properties of
bond and equity excess returns (risk premia1) and identify the effects of variations
in the volume of securitization on asset prices. The benchmark empirical specifica-
tion builds upon the work of Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003), and sets up a
general vector autoregressive (VAR) process for asset returns including the volume
of securitization, the bond premium and the equity premium. Additionally, as they
do, we include the short-term rate, the dividend-price ratio and the yield spread.
We find that an innovation to the growth of asset-backed securitization leads to
1We will use excess returns and risk premia interchangeably. Note that in some studies risk
premia is defined as the expected excess return.
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a statistically and economically significant drop in term spreads, equity and bond
premia and contributes to explain their variance. Although the benchmark empi-
rical analysis focuses on the period before the crisis, we find that the relationship
between securitization and asset prices seem to hold also for the post-crisis period
(after 2008) and is not driven by the surge in securitization in the years preceding
the crisis. We then augment the model in order to detect whether this link is re-
lated to financial intermediation or whether securitization might be instrumenting
for other aspects of the economy or the financial markets. As such we control for
risk perceptions/aversion (vix), for the Cochrane-Piazessi factor (CP), accounting
for the consumer’s heteroscedastic discount factor as suggested by Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2005), for expectations about economic performance, for changes in credit
conditions (credit spread) and equity payoff (expected earnings-per-share). Our re-
sults remain largely unchanged and thus indicate that specific aspects of financial
intermediation that are related to fluctuations in securitization affect different asset
classes other than credit.
While comparing the effects of different segments of the securitization market
we find that the link between securitization and asset prices is stronger with asset-
backed securities than with mortgage-backed securities. We believe that this is
because shadow banks and security brokers and dealers became important players
in the ABS market reinforcing the view that the effect occurs through the portfo-
lio allocation changes due to securitization. Data from the Federal Reserve Bank
Flow of Funds on total asset holdings and their growth during the 90’s and 2000’s,
depicted in Figure 2, confirms the importance of these financial entities2 relative to
commercial banks and other sectors in the economy (households and non-financial
firms). Note that the accumulation of assets of these entities is very much linked
to the volume of securitized assets issued in the US market. The growth of assets
is faster during the 90’s as the volume of securitization quickly reached around 50
billion USD per month. After that, the growth rate of assets decreases during the
early 2000’s while monthly volumes of issuance in the securitization markets re-
mained fairly constant. Asset holdings start to increase sharply again during the
next period of growth in the securitization market, from 2002/2003 until 2006/2007,
when monthly issuance reached 200 billion USD. In fact, when we include both se-
curitization and security broker and dealers asset holdings in our (quarterly) VAR
specification we confirm this link, an innovation to the asset backed securitization
leads to a sharp increase in asset holdings.
We then propose a theoretical model that can account for our empirical findings
and use it to discuss the channels through which financial intermediation and par-
ticularly, securitization practices, affect asset prices and risk premia. The model’s
two key ingredients are: banks3 can create a market for securitized assets by de-
signing and selling synthetic securities (securitization decision), and select which
assets to hold in their balance sheet (portfolio decision). In creating the securitiza-
tion market we follow DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) closely and motivate the issuance
2Shadow banks comprise of financial companies, funding corporations and ABS issuers. We
then add assets of security brokers and dealers and compare their total to that of commercial
banks.
3Unless otherwise specified banks are generic financial entities holding a diversified portfolio of
assets and engaging in financial intermediation.
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Figure 2: Increasing Relevance of Financial Sector
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of synthetic securities as a tool to create liquidity. Banks select the allocation of
assets to maximize expected returns subject to two constraints: they must fund all
purchases with internal and with, potentially costly, external funds and they must
abide by a risk constraint. We find that securitization, or the pooling and tranching
of credit assets, allows banks to expand their balance sheets since it not only relaxes
the banks’ cash or funding constraint but also their risk constraint. As a result,
securitization allows banks to take additional exposures not only on credit but also
on bonds and equity. The desire to increase exposure in all asset classes stems from
the fact that concentrating asset holdings in one class depresses returns and, due
to lack of diversification, increases the shadow cost of risk. Greater asset demand
increases prices and depresses risk premia, confirming the empirical results.
One of the implications of the theoretical model is that although the intrinsic
characteristics of assets, their return and risk profile, have not changed, and the
degree of risk aversion has remained the same, higher volumes of securitization
decrease the compensation for risk bearing in the economy. In other words, there is a
potential mismatch between actual and market price of risk due to the securitization
process. As pointed out by Rajan (2005), reduced premia/volatility does not directly
imply reduction in risk.
The framework also corroborates the importance of financial intermediation in
determining asset prices. As financial intermediation is linked with asset prices
through the functioning of the securitization market we can use the structural cha-
racteristic of this market to understand the channels through which this link occurs.
The volume of securitization in our model is primarily linked to the degree of asym-
metric information. Focusing on informational issues also allow us to stress the
optimality of pooling and tranching, key components behind the portfolio mecha-
nism we propose. However, the framework also highlights other drivers of the volume
of securitization, for instance, the degree of riskiness of credit baskets and the com-
pensation to undertake tranche related risk. While the volume of deals might be
influenced by a variety of factors, as long as pooling and tranching is done, allowing
banks to relax cash and risk constraints, the portfolio mechanism highlighted here
establishes a link between the variation in the volume of securitization (and those
factors) and bond and equity premia.
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Related Literature
Our work is connected to three main streams of literature. Firstly, it is linked
to the empirical literature that studies the effect of securitization on credit market
outcomes. Loutskina and Strahan (2009) show that credit supply is sensitive to
lender’s funding restrictions for illiquid loans, classified as such since they cannot
be securitized, but is not sensitive to their liquid counterpart. Hence, their results
indicate that high levels of securitization in the US would lead to higher loan supply.
Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2009) look at the banking sector in
Europe and conclude that securitization has strengthened banks’ capacity to supply
new loans. Finally, using data from Spain, Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´, and Saurina
(2010) conclude that wholesale finance allows banks with access to securitization to
increase their credit supply and decreases the aggregate price of credit. In all cases,
including ours, the common feature is that securitization leads to a balance sheet
expansion of banks. However, these studies look at credit markets only, while we
also consider the impact of securitization on other asset classes.
The second and main literature that our paper relates to is the one that focuses
on the effect of financial intermediation on asset prices. He and Krishnamurthy
(2013) show that, during periods of crisis, binding banking capital constraints help
to explain the evolution of risk premia. Our results indicate that different charac-
teristics of financial intermediaries’ balance sheets can be relevant in asset pricing
even when banking capital is not a direct concern. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014)
and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) stress that the growth of assets in the balance
sheet of security brokers and dealers influences asset prices and risk premia. These
studies are the closest to ours since as the data shows securitization and balance
sheet expansion of these entities are closely linked. Our added contribution is that,
by looking closely at the portfolio choice of financial intermediaries and incorpo-
rating one of the key aspects in their decision, namely, the ability to create and
sell synthetic assets, we are able to identify the potential channels and structural
parameters that link financial intermediation and asset prices. Finally, Aksoy and
Basso (2014) also explore the effects of bank’s portfolio choice but focus on maturity
transformation and the gap between long and short-term interest rates in a gene-
ral equilibrium setting, linking financial intermediation with fluctuations in term
premia.
Lastly, our paper relates to the literature that analyze leverage cycles. Daniels-
son, Shin, and Zigrand (2012) provide a framework linking financial intermediation,
leverage, volatility and risk premium, stressing the role of bank’s balance sheet in
asset price determination. However, their mechanism relies on fluctuations in bank
capital. Leverage in our framework fluctuates as an outcome of the securitization
markets while bank equity is held constant, and hence both mechanisms should rein-
force each other. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) also look at financial innovations
and leverage, and as here stress the importance of tranching to generate leverage.
However, they focus on the final investors’ demand based on heterogenous beliefs
leading to asset price bubbles while we focus on the importance of pooling and
tranching in shaping the portfolio decisions of banks, establishing a link between
financial intermediation and asset prices.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical analysis. The
theoretical model and its solution are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
the main implications of our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis focuses on establishing whether variations in the volume
of securitized credit assets traded affect different asset markets, looking particularly
at the dynamic patterns of risk premia in fixed income and equity markets. Our
starting point is a general vector autoregression (VAR) for asset returns used by
Campbell and Viceira (1999) and Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003). Campbell,
Chan, and Viceira (2003) employ a VAR containing the returns of the main fixed
income and equity assets, namely the short-term rate, the government bond excess
return (bond premium) and the equity excess return (equity premium). Additio-
nally, they include the dividend-price ratio and the yield/term spread (difference
between short and long term rates). Given our focus on securitization we add
the variation in the volume of securitized assets traded as an additional variable.
Our main interest, therefore, is in assessing whether there is additional information
content in fluctuations in securitization for explaining variations in excess market
and bond returns and establishing the effect of a shock to this additional variable on
the dynamic responses of asset returns. In order to identify these shock responses
we follow the identification structure of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).
As such, the VAR moving average representation is given by
zt = B(L)ut, (1)
where B(L) is the matrix of moving average coefficients and z
′
t = [x
′
1t, $
i′
t ,x
′
2t]
the vector of observables. $it represents the securitization measure we use, with
i = {dABSt, dMBSt, dALLst} for asset backed securitization, mortgage backed
securitization and aggregate securitization, used one at a time. Note that x1t is a
(k1×1) vector with elements whose contemporaneous and lagged values influence the
variables of interest at time t and x2t is a (k2×1) vector with elements whose values
are only affected by an innovation to the variables of interest at time t. Finally, ut
is a (k×1) vector of reduced form errors with k = k1 +1+k2. We want to obtain an
impact matrix A¯ linking reduced form errors (ut) to fundamental shocks (εt) such
that ut = A¯εt. We assume that A¯ has a block triangular structure with zero in its
upper diagonal.
For our benchmark analysis, we assume x1t is empty, placing all remaining va-
riables in x2t, hence the securitization variable is ordered first, being unaffected by
the other variables contemporaneously. This identification assumption reflects the
fact that the securitization process normally requires the creation of a new accoun-
ting entity (special purpose vehicles) that holds and commercializes the assets and
the pooling and tranching of assets that are then rated by external credit agencies.
As a result, it involves a time delay from decision to implementation greater than
the reaction time of asset prices. Thus, it appears natural to assume that asset
prices can only affect the volume of securitization with a lag.
Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) employ a first-order VAR using a relatively
long dataset of quarterly or annual frequency. As shown in the introduction, the de-
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velopment of the securitization market is a recent event (last 15-20 years). Moreover,
given our identification and the fact that a bank’s portfolio selection should occur at
much shorter frequency, we use a monthly dataset. As a result, in order to capture
sufficient dynamics (particularly in fixed income return) we estimate the model with
four lags. We calculate impulse responses to a securitization shock and associated
one standard error bias-corrected bootstrap confidence bands as suggested by Kilian
(1998). Before discussing the estimation results we present the dataset.
2.1. Data
Our securitization data, obtained from Dealogic,4 consists of daily data on asset
(ABS) and mortgage backed securitization (MBS) with tranche values and deal
dates completed in the US from the year 1993 onwards. Using this dataset, we are
able to construct monthly time series data of the volume of transacted securities in
the US financial markets. Figure 1 (depicted in the introduction) displays the levels
data for both ABS and MBS securitization volumes and an aggregate measure
(all), with their summation. As is clear from the figure, while securitization started
from rather modest levels by early 1990s, aggregate securitization steadily increased
reaching their peak in March 2007. We note that the asset backed securitization
increased from a monthly average of 5.2 billion USD in 1993 to 86.4 billion USD in
2006 (a 1540% increase) and the mortgage backed securitization increased from a
monthly average of 3.5 billion USD in 1993 to 93.4 billion USD in 2006 (a 2603%
increase). By the second quarter of 2007 both securitization markets collapsed and
volumes remained at much lower levels as compared to pre-crisis period. Figure 1
suggests that there is a structural break in the securitization process in 2007 where
market of synthetic securities froze and financial institutions and/or final investors
started to move away from the practice long before the full blown realization of the
financial crisis in September 2008 triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.5
In the VAR, we include seasonally adjusted asset and mortgage backed securi-
tization transformed in monthly log differences, denoting them respectively, dABS
and dMBS.6 We also construct a monthly aggregate securitization series (alls)
being the simple sum of MBS and ABS (labeled as dALLs). Next to the securi-
tization data, our empirical exercise utilizes the following data series. Benchmark
monthly excess market returns (xr) annualized, obtained from the Kenneth French
website, are based on Fama-French method and summarize the excess return on
the (equity) market over the risk free rate (3 months T-Bill rate). We use monthly
4We obtain a deal report with deal type equal to ABS or MBS, currency code equal to USD,
nationality of risk equal to USA and deal price date from beginning of 1993 until October 2014.
5It is clear that the actual global financial crisis started by mid 2007. As reported by the
Investment Company Institute (2012) “in June 2007 two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds suspended
redemptions in the face of deteriorating investments in securities backed by subprime mortgages.
[...] In the summer and fall of 2007 a range of additional short term investment pools (both
unregistered and offshore) began to fail after investing in securities backed by subprime mortgages.
In February 2008 the auction rate securities market froze as securities for sale exceeded demand,
auction agents refused to take the excess supply on their balance sheets, and all auctions failed.”
6We use Census X12 method to remove cyclical seasonal movements from securitization series
and to extract the underlying trend component. In our estimations we also use non-adjusted series
to check for the robustness of the results. Our results by and large do not change.
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Fama-Bliss Discount Bonds as reported by CRSP to calculate annual excess bond
returns (xbr) over 2,3,4 and 5 years horizons as described in Gurkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2007) for the calculation of yields and in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) for
the calculation of the excess bond returns, i.e. xbr
(n)
t+1 = r
(n)
t+1 − y(1)t where xbr(n)t+1
denotes the n year excess log return, r
(n)
t+1 denotes the log holding period return from
buying an n-year bond at time t and selling it as n− 1 year bond at time t+ 1 and
y
(1)
t denotes the log yield. We use a monthly real price dividend ratio (rpd) calcula-
ted using the log difference in real dividends and real stock prices (S&P Composite
Stock Price Index) as reported and updated by Robert Shiller’s stock market data.
Term spreads (spread) are computed as the difference between the five year govern-
ment bond rate and 3 months T-Bill in percentages per annum. Real short term
rates (realr 3m) are calculated using the 3 months T-Bill rate and the CPI infla-
tion. Our full sample covers the period from January 1993 up until October 2014.
However, conditional mean and variances have most likely changed as a result of
the financial crisis and central bank intervention, which influenced market liquidity
and consequently the securitization market, preventing us from estimating the full
period without accounting for the regime change. In order to do so we would need
a longer post-crisis dataset than we currently have. As a result, in our benchmark
VAR estimations we only use data from January 1993 till November 2007; thereby
we exclude the period after the collapse of the securitization market that later on
became a full blown financial crisis.7
2.2. Estimation Results - Parsimonious model
As mentioned before our starting point is a parsimonious representation of as-
set returns provided by Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003). We therefore set up the
benchmark VAR with Z
′
t =
[
$i′t ,x
′
2t
]
, where x2t = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt, xrt, realr 3mt].
Thus, the variable of interest, in a recursive fashion is log difference in securitization,
i.e. dABS or dMBS and the variables in x2t are respectively, log of dividend-price
ratio (rpd), term spreads (spread), excess bond returns over two years horizon (xbr),
excess market returns (xr), and short term real rates (realr 3m).
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses with respect to a shock to variations in
different types of securitization. The top panels show responses to a shock in changes
in ABS. We see that term spreads decline significantly. Excess bond (2Y) returns
show a significant decline that lasts nearly a year. Excess equity market returns do
not respond significantly instantly but suffer a sizeable and significant decline for
the next quarter, rebounding quickly after that. Although we only depict the one
standard deviation confidence bounds, the cumulative effect of the ABS on bond
premium after 5 periods and on the equity premium after 2 periods (their respective
peak effects) are both significant at 5% confidence level. The impulse responses show
the effect of changes in securitization volume when all the interactions amongst the
asset price variables are considered. We also run predictive return regressions8 that
7Although inference is problematic due to lack of data, in one of our robustness exercises we use
data after 2008 checking whether the link between securitization and asset prices remain unchanged,
see discussion in the next section and Appendix for results.
8We estimate Rxit+1 = αi + βi
′ ∗ Zt + εit+1, where Rxit+1 consists of excess returns on term
structure, bonds and equities and defined as Rxit+1 = [spreadt+1, xbrt+1, xrt+1] and Zt are the
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model
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include variations in asset backed securitization among return predictors similar to
Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010). Lags of asset backed securitization negatively
affect term spreads, bond and equity premia. Results show that the direct effect of
the changes in securitization (its second lag) on bond and equity premium are signi-
ficant at 10% and 5% confidence level, respectively (see Appendix for the regression
output results).
Our results indicate that the link between the variations in the volume of secu-
ritization and asset prices is not only statistically significant but also economically
significant. A monthly increase of 5 billion USD in the volume of ABS9 issued in
the market leads to a 6 basis point movement in bond premium after 5 periods,
which implies a 10% movement in bond premium relative to its sample mean, and
a 272 basis point decrease in equity premium after 2 periods, which implies a 35%
movement in excess return relative to its sample mean. In order to further analyze
the dynamic relationship between securitization and asset prices we also inspect the
forecast error variance decompositions (FEV). We observe that by the twelfth month
about 7.5% of variations in excess bond returns are attributable to shocks to varia-
tions in ABS, about 20% of variations are attributable to term spread shocks and
nearly 70% of variations are attributable to its own (excess bond returns) shocks.
FEV analysis in the case of excess equity market returns also shows a similar contri-
vector of return predictor variables with four lags with dividend price ratio and 3-months real
interest rate, lags on the excess returns next to variations in asset backed securitization. We define
Zt =
[
rpdt, realr 3mt, dABSt, Rx
i
t
]
.
9Apart from the period from 2004 and 2007, monthly issuance of ABS remained always bellow
50 billion USD.
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bution of dABS. Over a twelve month horizon, approximately 46% of forecast error
variance in excess market returns are attributable to shocks to dividend-price ratio,
whereas 6.2% of forecast error variance of excess returns are attributable to shocks
to variations in ABS. As is well known, excess market returns exhibit much less
persistence, thus only 39% of its forecast error variance are attributable to its own
shocks. Finally, VAR based excess market returns predictive estimation that in-
cludes dABS increases its in-sample-fit (as measured by the adjusted R-squared)
from 2% to 4% as compared with the VAR specification without the inclusion of
dABS.
The bottom panels exhibit responses to a shock to variations in mortgage backed
securitization. We observe that, initially, spreads decline as in the ABS case but the
movement is statistically insignificant. Excess bond returns response to the shock
is initially a decline, however it rebounds quickly and becomes insignificant. Finally
excess equity market returns response to mortgage backed securitization is similar
to its response to the asset backed securitization, i.e. no initial response followed
by a stronger and significant decline in excess returns. Overall, we find that the
response to a MBS shock is much less pronounced compared to the responses to
variations in asset backed securitization. When investigating the FEV, we note that
the contributions of shocks to variations in MBS to explain forecast error variance
of excess bond returns is negligible and around 2% for market returns.
We also run the VAR with the aggregate measure of securitization, dALL. Given
that the volume of securitization in the mortgage market (MBS) is normally greater
than that of ABS, the impulse responses (not reported here) are closer to the
one observed for MBS than for ABS. Overall securitization has a stronger and
more significant impact on equity premium than on bond premium. The FEV
for excess bond returns suggests that the role of shocks to aggregate securitization
in explaining the forecast error variations in excess bond and market returns are
negligible. In the case of excess market returns, the role of total securitization is
more pronounced in explaining the forecast error variance. By the twelfth month
about 10% of forecast error variance in excess market returns is attributable to
shocks to variations in aggregate securitization. Finally, VAR based excess market
returns predictive estimation that includes dALLs increases the in-sample-fit (as
measured by the adjusted R-squared) from 2% to 7% as compared with the VAR
specification without dALLs.10
We perform a series of robustness tests using the parsimonious model, focusing
only on the estimation using the variation in the volume of ABS. Details are presen-
ted in the appendix. Firstly, we verify whether the impact of securitization on asset
prices is driven by the remarkable increase in the volume of deals during the 2003-
2007 period, when many new financial instruments were introduced. We restrict
the data set to the period 1993 - 2002 and find that the negative impact of inno-
vations to securitization volumes on bond and equity premium remain unchanged.
However, securitization shocks contribute relatively less in explaining FEV in excess
bond and market returns for this sample period and the size movement in equity
premium after an ABS shock is also smaller, reducing to around 150 basis point for
a 5 billion monthly increase in ABS, indicating that the link between securitization
10All these results are robust to measures of excess bond returns up to five years horizon.
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and asset prices become more relevant during the 2003-2007 period.
Secondly, we use data from January 2009 until October 2013, effectively estima-
ting the period after crisis as a new regime.11 Although inference is impaired by the
lack of degrees of freedom, we find a similar pattern of response to both bond and
equity premia, with a downward movement of bond premium, reaching its lowest
level 5 periods after the securitization shock and equity premium moving down after
a few periods and rebounding quickly after that. Variance decomposition analysis
also paints a similar picture, with securitization shocks contributing to explaining
around 6% of forecast error variance in excess bond returns and around 4.5% of
FEV in excess market returns. Thus, the results indicate that the link between
securitization and risk premia across other asset classes has not been substantially
altered by the recent crisis, although the monthly volume of deals return to the
levels observed in the early 2000’s.
Thirdly, we focus on the identification assumption by altering the ordering of the
variables in the VAR. We set x2t = ∅ and x1t = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt, xrt, realr 3mt],
thus securitization can only affect asset prices with a lag, but is affected by the
other variables contemporaneously. The negative effect of securitization on bond
and equity premia are qualitatively unchanged. We also note that shocks to equity
and bond premia12 do not lead to lower volume of securitization (in fact if anything
securitization tend to initially increase after these shocks), thus reverse causality
does not seem to hold.
2.3. Estimation Results - Augmented model
The results of the parsimonious model of asset return dynamics indicate there is
a role for variations to the volume of asset backed securitization in explaining the
fluctuations in excess bond and excess market returns. Mortgage backed securitiza-
tion does not appear to be linked to excess bond returns, although it has significant
effects on the equity premium (thus variation in the total volume of securitization
explains a significant part of variations in excess market returns). In order to in-
crease our understanding of the added value of looking at the securitization markets
to explain risk premia, and assess the robustness of our results, we augment the
benchmark model in several directions, particularly focusing on the potential effects
of omitted variables.
We subdivide the vector x2t = [x2at,x2bt], such that x2bt = [rpdt, spreadt, xbrt,
xrt, realr 3mt] contains all the variables included into the benchmark model and
x2at represents additional controls. That way, all controls, together with the securi-
tization can have a contemporaneous effect on asset returns. We now explain each
control and the rationale for including them.
It is possible that including measures of securitization may be serving as instru-
ments for changes in some aggregate risk perception criteria. In order to try and
correct for possible biases due to this omission, we incorporate a market volatility
11Note that we need one year ahead data to calculate bond premia.
12In order to analyze the effect of, for instance, a shock of bond premium, we set x1t = xbrt
and the remaining variables as part of x2t, thus bond premium can affect securitization contem-
poraneously, but the VAR remain as close as possible to the benchmark case. We do the same for
spread and excess market returns.
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measure and set x2at = vixt. The CBOE Volatility Index (vix) captures the investor
sentiment and market volatility embedded in the near-term volatility conveyed by
S&P 500 market index option prices as provided by Bloomberg.
Securitization may also be related to future economic performance, as perceived
by market participants. In order to account for that we include a measure of consu-
mer expectation about future economic conditions: E5Y index is derived from a five
years forward looking question on confidence from the Michigan Index of Consumer
Expectations (see Barsky and Sims (2011) and Aksoy and Basso (2014) for different
applications of the relation between E5Y and future economic activity).
Of course, securitization practices may not be directly linked to general econo-
mic performance but could be linked to positive news on firm performance that in-
crease credit and equity payoffs. Thus, we firstly incorporate the expected earnings-
per-share (deps), which is calculated by using the twelve months forward weighted
average expected earnings per share based on S&P 500 composite as reported by
I/B/E/S. Secondly, we include a control for aggregate credit spread level using the
credit spread index proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), setting x2at = GZt.
Finally, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) have shown that the five year government
bond forward rate is a useful predictor of the excess returns on two year bonds
when we abandon the expectations hypothesis. Their explanation is based on the
consumption Euler condition. When bond prices are determined by the expected re-
lative marginal utilities divided by inflation, a conditionally heteroscedastic discount
factor will generate time varying bond risk premium. Therefore, if financial inter-
mediaries securitization decision is unrelated to the consumption Euler condition,
we should see additional information content in variations in securitization next to
Cochrane-Piazessi factor (CP); so we set alternatively x2at = CPt.
Figure 4 displays the corresponding impulse responses that include one of the
additional controls at a time when dABS and when dMBS are used as the securi-
tization measure, respectively. An inspection of those figures suggests that impulse
responses remain broadly the same after the inclusion of different controls. Hence,
we conclude that a shock to changes in asset backed securitization leads to a decline
in term premium, equity and bond premia, while there is no significant impact of a
shock to mortgage backed securitization on excess bond returns and a negative but
a relatively smaller effect on excess returns on equity.
Inclusion of the financial markets volatility as a proxy for risk perceptions (vix)
changes the profile of FEV in the case of excess market (equity) returns. When the
VAR includes dABS by the twelfth month about 5.8% of variations in excess market
returns are attributable to shocks to variations in ABS, about 42% of variations
are attributable to shocks to vix, about 20% of forecast error variance in excess
market returns are attributable to shocks to dividend-price ratio, whereas 23% of
forecast error variance of excess returns are attributable to its own shocks. In other
words, vix is relevant in explaining variations in the excess market returns, but
crucially, the contribution of the volume of securitization remains largely unchanged.
A similar picture arises when vix is included in the VAR with dMBS. In the case
of VAR estimation with dALLs, by the twelfth month, about 9% of FEV in excess
market returns are attributable to shocks to dALLs, 43% to shocks to vix, 19% to
shocks to price-dividend ratio and about 22% to shocks to excess market returns.
Finally, while the CP factor appears to help explain the FEV in bond excess returns,
12
Figure 4: Augmented Models - Results
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ties
controlling for it does not affect the shape of the impulse responses nor the FEV
contribution of ABS shocks. By the twelfth month, the shocks to dABS account
for about 6% of FEV decompositions in bond excess returns while the CP factor
account for nearly 71% of variations.
The empirical results, therefore, indicate that securitization impacts negatively,
both, the bond and the equity premia. Moreover, this explanatory power is not
related to the potential link between the changes in the volume of transactions
in the securitization market with the degree of risk perception/aversion of agents,
intertemporal consumption Euler conditions, or with the general economic or credit
and equity returns outlook. As a result, the channel through which this effect occurs
may be more directly related to the functioning of financial intermediation when the
originate to distribute mode of operation is more heavily employed. Given that our
results are stronger when the volume of asset-backed securities is used instead of
the one of mortgage backed securities, one must look at shadow banks and security
brokers and dealers, which are more active in that niche of the market relative to
traditional commercial banks. Furthermore, shadow banks and brokers and dealers
normally hold a more diverse portfolio of assets that are not only concentrated
on credit products but also contain equity and fixed income products, making the
potential portfolio effects of the high activity in securitization markets more likely
to be observed.
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) look at the
link between the growth rate of asset holdings of security brokers and dealers and va-
rious asset price measures, stressing the importance of financial intermediation and
leverage in determining asset prices. The Federal Reserve Bank data on asset hol-
dings of financial entities however is only available at a quarterly frequency. We thus
run three sets of estimation of a quarterly frequency VAR (with 1 lag). The first in-
cludes the same variables as in the benchmark case. The second includes the growth
rate of security brokers and dealers asset holdings as an additional control variable
and finally we exclude our securitization variable, leaving asset holdings amongst the
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variables included in the estimation. Results are presented in the Appendix. From
the first estimation we observe that a securitization shock leads to lower equity pre-
mia and term spreads, although the effect on bond premium is insignificant. When
security brokers and dealers assets are included, the effect of securitization on risk
premia are quantitatively the same and as expected we also observe that asset hol-
dings respond positively to a securitization shock. Finally, when securitization is
excluded we find that the impact of innovations to the growth rate of asset holdings
does not lead to significant changes to risk premia. We believe both our results and
theirs are complementary, pointing to the importance of financial intermediation in
explaining asset prices. By focusing on the volume of securitization, we highlight
the potential mechanism through which this link occurs. Consequently, in order to
increase our understanding of the potential channels through which securitization
and financial intermediation activity affects asset prices we build a model of finan-
cial intermediation where securitization is used as a form of funding by a financial
entity (bank) who holds a diverse portfolio of assets that include credit, government
bonds and equity. We turn to that next.
3. Model
In order to provide a rationale for the empirical results presented above, we
build a partial equilibrium model that focuses particularly on the portfolio choice of
banks when securitization of credit assets held on the balance sheet is feasible. As
such, banks will face two key decisions: the securitization decision, which entails the
creation of the securitization market by designing and selling synthetic securities,
and the portfolio decision of which assets to hold on their balance sheet.
Initially, there are three assets available for the bank to invest in, credit assets
(loans), denoted Yi for i ∈ [1, n], government bonds (B), and equity (E). Banks
will select a portfolio of assets to maximize expected returns (profit) facing two
constraints: (i) a cash constraint, as asset purchases must be funded by internal
funds (capital) and external funds, which comprise of direct bank borrowing and po-
tential resources prevenient from the securitization market and (ii) a risk constraint,
such that banks care about risk.
A fourth asset, denoted F , will be created by the bank. We assume the bank
creates a Special Purpose Vehicle (henceforth, SPV) which will serve as the agent
commercializing this asset to final investors. Banks are willing to securitize assets
since they have a preference for liquidity13 (denoted by δ), which is passed on to the
SPV. This assumption ensures securitization is a cheaper form of funding relative to
direct borrowing. The payoff of F will be a function of the performance of the basket
of credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1, depending on the security design. We assume banks receive
information about the payoff structure of credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1 that is not available to
the market at large, hence, the key component influencing the securitization market
will be the existence of this information asymmetry.
13Liquidity generation is not the only reason for securitizing assets. This may occur due to
the desire to transfers risk. The risk effect will also be explored in our model. For a model
where securitization does not transfer risk but is used to reduce capital requirements see Acharya,
Schnabl, and Suarez (2013).
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In order to simplify the exposition and its solution, we divide the model into four
stages. In the first stage the bank sets up the SPV, selecting the design of security
F . During stage 2 the bank receives private information not available to the market
at large and selects its portfolio composition. At stage 3 all assets are transacted
and in the final stage uncertainty is revealed and assets pay-out. Figure 5 shows the
timeline of the model.
Figure 5: Model Timeline
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3.1. Securitization Decision
The securitization decision involves the design of the synthetic security and the
setting up of the SPV. Based on that the equilibrium in the securitization market
is obtained, allowing the quantity of asset F that is transacted and the price to
be determined. These variables will then be used in the portfolio decision to be
explained next. Hence, the key assumption is that the securitization and portfolio
decisions can be solved independently. This is accomplished by assuming that the
SPV only cares about the liquidity generated from the securitization market and that
the equilibrium in this market is independent from the portfolio allocation (we relax
the second assumption in section 3.4). The securitization part of the model follows
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) closely. In order to determine the
security design and the market equilibrium we introduce a number of assumptions
regarding the credit assets.
Each asset i has a final payoff of Yi = Xi+Zi. The component Xi represents the
bank’s private information about the payoff of the credit asset that is not available
to other investors. Zi represents the remaining risk the bank faces. We assume Zi
can be divided into two components, an idiosyncratic part and an aggregate credit
market component, thus Zi = i+η. Let Y
n ≡∑ni=1 Yi denote the cumulative payoff
of credit assets and Y ≡ (Y1, . . . , Yn) the vector of assets. Same definitions hold for
X, Xn, Z, and Zn. Finally, let X−i ≡ (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn).
We then make the following assumptions
• A1. E[Zi | X] = 0 or E[Yi | X] = Xi.
• A2. Given any X−i, the conditional support of Xi is a closed interval and has
greatest lower bound Xi0 > 0.
• A3. i and η are independent of X and have log-concave density functions.
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Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that X comprises all information available on Y ,
that given the information on all other assets, there is still a range of possible infor-
mation states for asset i, and that the lower bound of that range is independent of
X−i. Finally, Assumption 3 ensures enough regularity on the distribution of shocks
to allow for the determination of the security design.
The securitization market and the creation of SPV
We assume the bank issues synthetic securities F and place them on the balance
sheet of an SPV. The key characteristic of the SPV is its preference for transforming
these securities in cash, or a liquidity preference. We denote this preference by
parameter δ.14 Based on that, the SPV selects the amount q of synthetic securities
to sell. Let PF (q) denote the price of the synthetic security F when q units are sold,
or the demand schedule for security F . Then the SPV selects q equals to
arg max
q∈[0,1]
qPF (q) + δ(1− q)E[F | X] = arg max
q∈[0,1]
q(PF (q)− δE[F | X]) (2)
Thus, the preference for liquidity implies that assets not sold are discounted
relative to the cash gains from transacted synthetic securities. Therefore, the key
characteristic of the SPV is its desire to sell as much securities F as possible, since
it prefers holding cash (and transferring it back to the bank) than holding F on
its balance sheet (although its price might be equal to its expected value). The
main obstacle for the SPV or for the functioning of the securitization market is the
existence of information asymmetries between the final investor and the SPV. Given
its preference for liquidity, if the security F is priced according to its value based on
all information available, let that price be f = E[F | X], then the SPV would want
to publicly offer all stock of synthetic securities or set q = 1. Would final investors
be willing to buy all the stock of synthetic securities? Final investors do not have the
same information set as the bank and will be trying to determine the appropriate
price. Assume he/she bids the lowest possible price (linked to the lower bound of
X, denoted f0 = E[F | X = X0]). On the on hand, if the SPV/bank receives a
signal X > X0, the value of the security is higher than the price bid by the final
investor and thus the SPV may not be willing to sell all the stock of securities F ,
offering only a lower proportion to the market (q < 1), thus indicating to investors
that the security is better than expected and its price should be greater than f0.
On the other hand, if the SPV received the worst possible signal (X = X0), it will
sell all securities confirming the final investor’s initial expectation. Hence, given a
bid price of PF , the public offer of the SPV (q) will convey information about the
bank’s private information on the conditional payoff of the security. In summary,
the SPV security retention (offering q < 1) is a credible signal (of higher X) since
retention is costly due to its preference for liquidity. The market equilibrium (PF , q)
is thus the equilibrium of a signalling game in which uninformed investors compete
for purchases of the security being offered by the SPV in a Walrasian market setting.
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) provide the following characterization of this equili-
brium.
14We later link that to the implicit value of the cash constraint of the bank portfolio problem.
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Under assumptions A1 - A2,
q = (f/f0)
−1/(1−δ) and PF = f0(q)δ−1 = f (3)
is a unique separating equilibrium. The SPV payoff function will be ΠSPV (f, f0) =
q(PF (q) − δE[F | X]) = f0(1 − δ)(f/f0)−δ/(1−δ), where f = E[F | X], and f0 =
E[F | X = X0]. The equilibrium is obtained by solving (2), conditional on PF = f ,
and imposing the boundary condition that PF (1) = f0.
Optimal Design of F
Having obtained the characterization of the equilibrium in the securitization
market we can now solve backwards to determine the security design (stage 1 in
the model15). Given the timeline of the model the synthetic security design is done
before X is revealed to the bank. Hence, the optimal design problem is given by
maxF (.) E[Π
SPV (f, f0)]. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) show that
under assumptions A1 - A3 the optimal monotone security design is a standard debt
contract.16 That is F ∗(Y ) = min(d, Y n) for a constant d (face value). The intuition
is simple. The bank/SPV would like to maximize the volume of securitized assets,
but due to the information asymmetry, is forced to retain some synthetic assets in
the portfolio when the signal is good and information asymmetry is high. Hence, it
is optimal for the SPV to select a security that is as payoff insensitive as possible
for the range of signals where asymmetry is at its highest. Standard debt has this
property since f does not change significantly as X increases in the range X  d.
That way, the bank problem is
max
d
E[ΠSPV (fd, fd0 )], where f
d = E[min(d, Y n) | X].
In order to provide further characterization on the debt contract, PF and q,
we assume that η ∼ N(0, σ2) (recall that η is the aggregate credit shock affecting
all credit assets) and Xn is uniformly distributed between X0 =
∑
i xi0 and X1 =∑
i xi1. As we increase the number of securities n, the value of f becomes
fdn = E[min(d,X
n + (1/n)
∑
i + η) | X]→ E[min(d,Xn + η) | X] = fd
fd =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
df(η)dη
where f(η) is the density function of η
fd = XnΦ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
+ d
(
1− Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
))
− σφ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the standard normal cumulative and density functions
15Note that we do not need to determine the decision in stage 2 since the optimal design and
the portfolio decision are independent.
16We are assuming the bank will find it optimal to pool all credit assets together and set a debt
contract dependent on Y n, instead of issuing a security F for each asset Yi. As DeMarzo (2005)
shows, for a large number of securities in the pool, when the variance of the idiosyncratic risk i
is big enough, the risk diversification effect is stronger than the information destruction effect. In
this scenario, pooling and tranching delivers higher payoff than tranching alone.
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Also note that fd0 = X0Φ
(
d−X0
σ
)
+d
(
1− Φ (d−X0
σ
))−σφ (d−X0
σ
)
. The aggregate
shock η, which is not diversified away as the basket of credit is constructed can also
be understood as the correlation risk amongst assets Yi, for i ∈ [1, n], within the
basket.
Based on the solution for fd and fd0 , d
∗ is given by
d∗ = arg max
∫ X1
X0
(1− δ)(fd0 )1/(1−δ)(fd)−δ/(1−δ)
1
(X1 −X0)dX (4)
We are not able to obtain an analytical solution to this integral and thus offer a
description of the main trade-off involved in the selection of the optimal face value,
d∗. Due to the presence of information asymmetry the SPV is forced to retain a
fraction (1− q) of synthetic securities. That is costly since it prevents the SPV from
maximizing liquidity creation. Hence, one of the drivers behind the selection of d∗
is to minimize the information sensitivity of F . Figure 6 shows the pay-off of the
synthetic security to the final investor for a low value of d = d˜ (left-hand side) and
for a high value of d = dˆ < X0, also depicting the range of possible information
Xn ∈ [X0, X1]. On the one hand, when d is small, the probability that Y n (payoff of
credit) is such that the payoff of final investors is negative (region A) is quite small
(far away from range [X0, X1]) and the actual loss is also small. On the other hand,
when d is high the probability that Y n is such that the payoff is negative (region B)
is greater (not far from range [X0, X1]) and the potential loss more sizeable. Hence,
for d = dˆ it is relevant from the point of view of the final investor to know if Xn = X0
or Xn = X1, while when d = d˜ it is not as much. That is, the bank wants to select
d∗ as small as possible to minimize the information sensitivity of F , maximizing q.
However, as the bank decreases d∗, it also decreases PF (d∗) since d∗ > PF (d∗). As a
result, total cash for each unit of synthetic security sold is smaller. Thus, the desire
to maximize cash receipts from securitization through the price of security pushes
d∗ up. Optimal d∗ balances the trade-off between these two effects, maximizing
PF (d
∗)q(d∗).
Figure 6: Synthetic Security Payoff and Optimal d
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3.2. Portfolio decision
Banks select a portfolio of equity, government bonds and credit to maximize
expected returns. Banks invest in three main assets: credit assets (loans), denoted
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Yi for i ∈ [1, n], government bonds (B), and equity (E). Given the assumptions
made on the returns of credit assets [Yi]
n
i=1, and the fact that banks pool all these
assets to design the synthetic security, instead of looking at each asset i, we can
concentrate directly on the credit basket whose payoff is equal to Y n. Let Qy be the
quantity of pooled credit assets the banks buy. Recall that due to the diversification
of idiosyncratic risks (i), the only source of risk of the basket of credit comes from
the aggregate uncertainty (η). We assume the price of the basket is given by its
expected payoff conditional on the banks information set Py = E[Y
n | Xn], but
also that the bank can extract a credit mark-up (denoted µ(Xn, Qy)) while acting
as a financial intermediary. Although we do not model that explicitly this could
be due to the its informational advantage as in DeMarzo (2005), or because it has
some bargaining power over firms/agents that make loans. We assume µ(Xn, Qy) is
a function of (i) the signal Xn; the greater Xn relative to the lower bound X0 the
greater the bank’s information advantage and thus higher the mark-up; and (ii) the
quantity transacted Qy; the greater the bank’s demand for credit assets (supply of
loans), the lower its mark-up. Thus, for µ1, µ2 > 0, we assume
µ(Xn, Qy) = µ¯+ µ1(X
n −X0)/X0 − µ2Qy. (5)
Government bonds payoff is given by VB. We assume VB ∼ N($B, σ2B). Banks
buy QB units of bonds and pay price PB for each unit. Equity payoff is given by
VE. We assume VE ∼ N($E, σ2E). Banks buy QE units of equity and pay a unit
price PE. Banks take prices PE and PB as given while selecting their portfolio
composition. Prices are then determined in equilibrium based on market demand
schedules PB(QB) and PE(QE) given by
PB = αB + βBQB (6)
PE = αE + βEQE. (7)
In order to fund these assets, banks utilize internal funds (capital), denoted by
Γ0, and external funds. These consist of direct bank borrowing (Υ) and resources
prevenient from the securitization market, which, from the results in the previous
section, comprise of qPF for each unit of pooled credit asset (Qy). As a result
of the separation between the securitization and portfolio decisions, the bank, at
this stage, takes (q, PF , f, f0,) as given. The cost of bank borrowing is given by
RF = R¯ + κ(Υ/Γ0). Thus, we assume the cost of external funding increases from
a base rate R¯ as borrowing increases relative to the amount of bank capital. Bank
profits/returns (ΠB) are then given by
ΠB | Xn = Qy(Y n − Py) + µ(Xn, Qy)Qy
+QB(VB − PB) +QE(VE − PE)− qQy(F − PF )−RFΥ. (8)
We assume banks select the portfolio composition (Qy, QB, QE,Υ) to maximize
the expected profits E[ΠB | Xn] subject to two constraints. The first asserts that
the cost of purchase of assets is equal to the amount of funds, or a cash constraint.
That is given by
QyPy +QBPB +QEPE 6 Γ0 + qQyPF + Υ (9)
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The second ensures the bank abides by a limit on risk taking or a risk constraint.17
It is common to assume that this constraint takes the form of the first percentile
of the distribution of expected returns, or a Value-at-risk constraint. Although
widely used in practice this type of constraint introduces complexity to the portfolio
problem. Instead, we assume that the bank faces a limit to the standard deviation
of the portfolio returns. If the assets in the portfolio were only credit, bonds and
equity, given the assumption on normally distributed payoff, the two constraints
(limit on standard deviation and on the percentile of the distribution) are equivalent.
When synthetic products are incorporated the two may diverge since asset F ’s payoff
distribution is not symmetric.
The standard deviation of the portfolio returns is given by
σΠB | Xn =
(
Q2yσ
2 +Q2Bσ
2
B +Q
2
Eσ
2
E + 2QyQBσyB + 2QyQEσyE +
2QBQEσEB − 2qQ2yσFY − 2qQyQBσFB − 2qQyQEσFE + q2Q2yσ2F
)1/2
.
Where σab is the covariance between the payoff of securities a and b, and σ
2
F is the
variance of the synthetic security. The risk constraint limits the standard deviation
of the bank profits to be smaller or equal to a fraction of the total capital of the
bank. This fraction (χ), denotes the degree of risk aversion of the bank. Thus, the
portfolio choice must be such that
σΠB 6 χΓ0. (10)
Given the security design and the solution for fd we can now determine the
variance and covariances that involve the synthetic security F . These are (details
can be found in the Appendix)
σ2F |Xn = (Xn)2Φ( d−X
n
σ )−2Xnσφ( d−X
n
σ )−σ2[ d−X
n
σ
φ( d−X
n
σ )−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]+d2[1−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]−(fd)2
σFy |Xn = (Xn)2Φ( d−X
n
σ )−2Xnσφ( d−X
n
σ )
−σ2[ d−Xnσ φ( d−X
n
σ )−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]+d[Xn(1−Φ( d−X
n
σ ))+σφ(
d−Xn
σ )]−fdXn
σFB |Xn ≈ Φ( d−Xnσ )σyB
σFE |Xn ≈ Φ( d−Xnσ )σyE
The portfolio problem is given by
max
{Qy ,QB ,QE ,Υ}
E[ΠB | Xn] s.t. (9) and (10) (11)
Note that as a solution to this problem is obtained, one can find the shadow
value (in term of profits) of an extra unit of cash holding to the bank (Lagrange
multiplier of the cash constraint, denoted λc). We can use this multiplier to pin
down the value of δ, the bank’s liquidity preference, or the discount factor of the
SPV. Essentially, we will set δ = 1 − λc, where λc is obtained when the portfolio
decision is solved while setting q = 0, or without securitization. This way we assess
the bank’s desire to obtain cash from securitization.
17Adrian and Shin (2008) provide a contracting model motivating the use of such constraints.
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3.3. Model Results
The equilibrium of the model is defined as the vector of asset allocations {Qy,
QB, QE, Υ, q} and the vector of prices {µ, PB, PE, PF , d} such that (i) given prices,
{Qy, QB, QE,Υ} solves problem (11); (ii) {q, PF} is a separating equilibrium of
the signalling game; (iii) the face value of debt d is given by (4); and (iv) given
{Qy, QB, QE}, prices {µ, PB, PE} are consistent with the credit spread (mark-up),
(5), and the market demand schedules (6) and (7).
Our main interest is to verify the effect of securitization on the portfolio allocation
of banks, and through that, its effect on asset risk premia. The bond risk premia in
our model can be defined as BP (QB) ≡ E[VB] − PB, while the equity risk premia
is given by EP (QE) ≡ E[VE] − PE. Given that the portfolio decisions and the
equilibrium in the securitization market are a function of the information set Xn ∈
[X0, X1], the equilibrium is obtained for X
n within that interval. Note that when
Xn = X0, banks do not have an information advantage over the market, since
the existence of the lower bound X0 is known. However, as X
n increases from
X0, banks have an advantage in determining the true value of the credit basket,
hence, the degree of information asymmetry between final investors and the bank
increases. We solve the model for two cases, one where we constrain q = 0, hence
the market of securitization is disregarded (denoted Model No Sec) and one where q,
the securitization volume, is obtained based on the separating equilibrium described
above (denoted Model with Sec).
Due to the non-linearity of the risk constraint and the integral needed to be solved
to obtain the face value of debt (see (4)) we can only obtain numerical solutions. The
parameters used in the benchmark specification are shown in Table 1.18 Starting
from the return parameters, we set the mean payoff on bonds to be around 5% and
the mean payoff on equity to be that plus 3%. The parameters {αB, αE} are set
such that if banks do not buy any bonds or equity the risk premia on each asset
are slightly above their mean average in the data used in the empirical section.
Parameters {βB, βE} control the sensitivity of the risk premia to increases in bank
asset demand. This is set such that if the bank uses all its capital to buy one asset
it offsets most of the premia, ensuring bank portfolios are not concentrated in one
asset. We set the credit basket to pay a mark-up slightly greater than the equity
premium since credit is the riskier asset. The variance and covariance structure
is based on the data for government bond returns, the return on the S&P500 and
the credit spread index (GZ) proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). Using
this data we find that the standard deviation of equity returns is 60% the standard
deviation of credit spreads, while that ratio is 20% for the case of government bonds.
All asset payoffs are found to be negatively correlated as reported in the table. We
set X0 to be equal to 1.02 and the degree of information asymmetry m, given by
the different between X0 and X1, is set to 0.2 (two times the standard deviation
of the aggregate shock). Finally, we set δ to be equal to 1 minus the Lagrange
multiplier obtained from the solution of the bank portfolio when securitization is
not performed and limit the standard deviation of the portfolio to be 7% of the
banking capital (under normally distributed returns that would imply limiting the
18Although no calibration exercise is done we attempt to select parameters based on the relevant
financial market data.
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loss under the first percentile (Value-at-risk) to roughly 25% of bank capital). We
perform different sensitivity analysis to most of the parameters described in table
1 to verify the robustness of our predictions, but also as a tool to increase the
understanding of the key mechanism behind the impact of securitization on risk
premia.
Table 1: Parameter Values - Benchmark Model
Return Variance Bank
$E 0.03+1/0.95 σY 0.1 δ 0.983
$B 1/0.95 σB 0.02 Γ0 5
αB $B - 0.02 σE 0.06 χ 0.07
αE $B +0.01 ρEY -0.49
βB
1
Γ0
0.025 ρEB -0.57
βE
1
Γ0
0.025 ρBY -0.4
R¯ 0.01
κ 1
Γ0
0.05 Information
µ1 0.01 X0 1.02
µ2
1
Γ0
0.005 m 0.2
µ¯ 0.04 X1 X0 +m
3.3.1. Benchmark model
We start by presenting the results of the benchmark model. Figure 7 shows the
difference between the equilibrium of the full model (Model with Sec) and the one
obtained by setting q = 0, or restricting the bank to do no securitization. We report
the bond and equity premia, the final credit market spread or mark-up (µ(Xn, Qy)),
the bank’s asset holdings/balance sheet (Qy+QB+QE), the amount of securitization
(q) and finally the percentage point change in the ratio of external borrowing and
bank capital, measuring the degree of leverage based on direct borrowing. The
results are shown for the entire range Xn ∈ [X0, X1].19 Note that the degree of
information asymmetry in the market is directly related to the difference between Xn
and the lower bound X0, which is known. Hence, we define information asymmetry
as the ratio (Xn −X0)/X0.
Firstly, allowing for securitization to be conducted implies the bank is able to
increase its asset holdings (balance sheet) across all the range of information asym-
metries ([0, (X1 −X0)/X0]). This increase pushes bond premium, equity premium
and credit mark-up down. Second, securitization is at its highest when information
asymmetry is at its lowest. The SPV does not need to retain any synthetic security
when it does not have an informational advantage relative to final investors. As in-
formation asymmetry increases it must retain a greater portion of synthetic assets,
not being able to exploit the securitization market as much. As a result, balance
sheet expansion generally decreases with more information asymmetry,20 and conse-
quently, the equilibrium bond and equity premium respond less. The balance sheet
19We smooth the final solution to correct for potential inaccuracies in the numerical optimization
solution, see the Appendix for more details.
20The increase observed as Xn → X1 occurs since securitization shares become constant but
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Figure 7: Benchmark Model
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expansion affects all three assets for two main reasons: (i) due to market demand
sensitivity concentrating all expansion in one asset reduces the return on that asset
relative to the others, and (ii) due to diversification gains banks are able to manage
risk exposures more effectively by increasing allocation of all assets. Another inter-
esting feature is the effect of securitization on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
We observe that securitization replaces external borrowing as a source of funding, in
fact securitization becomes the main source of funding. Leverage based on external
borrowing (Υ) decreases significantly relative to the case when securitization is not
allowed.
Hence, the key conclusion of the theoretical model is that although the intrinsic
characteristics of the assets (payoff and risk) in the banks portfolio has not changed
and the bank’s degree of risk aversion (represented by parameter χ) has remained
the same, we observe that the risk premia required to maintain those assets on the
balance sheet decrease substantially as securitization is employed. This confirms the
empirical results presented in section 2. We find that an increase in securitization
implies a drop in risk premia after controlling for a set of variables that are related to
the future payoff of the assets (e.g. dividend/price ratios, earnings-per-share, consu-
mer expectations) or the degree of risk aversion in the market (e. g. vix). The main
driver of the volume of securitization is the degree of information asymmetry. Thus,
through the portfolio selection of the bank, the degree of information asymmetry in
credit markets leads to variation in risk premia.
credit assets are becoming relatively better assets and PF increases with X
n and thus the liquidity
created for each unit of securitized asset increases.
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This portfolio channel is present due to the effect of securitization on the two
main constraints the bank faces. Firstly, while external funds are costly since direct
borrowing must carry an interest rate that is increasing as bank leverage increases,
banks are able to acquire funds by creating and selling the synthetic securities that
are linked to their balance sheet holdings at significantly lower costs. Thus, securi-
tization relaxes the bank’s cash constraint. Secondly, by designing a debt contract
as the format of the synthetic security the bank is also decreasing the extent of
risk taking in credit markets. To see this compare the payoff of a (naked) credit
basket (left panel in Figure 8), the short position on the synthetic security (middle
panel in Figure 8) and a portfolio that combines a long position on the basket and
a short position on the synthetic security (or the final portfolio of the bank after
securitization, depicted in the right panel of Figure 8). The short position on the
synthetic security essentially protects the bank against losses when the credit bas-
ket payoff (Y n) is lower than the face value of debt (d). Thus, securitization also
relaxes the bank’s risk constraint.21 As a result, banks find it optimal to increase
asset holdings. Since banks have a preference for diversification both due to the risk
constraint and the negative expected gain from overbidding in one single market,
banks increase holding of all asset classes. Therefore, securitization of credit implies
low risk premia across all asset classes.
Figure 8: Risk Profile
Pay-off Credit
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Pay-out Synthetic Sec. (F )
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In the benchmark model we assume banks select d optimally to maximize the
SPV gains from securitization. Given that the key aim is to decrease the effects
of information asymmetry and thus reduce SPV retention of synthetic securities,
banks set d∗ quite low (optimal d is 0.81, significantly lower than X0 = 1.02).22
As a result, the proportion of securitized assets traded (q) is greater than 0.94 for
all Xn. However d∗ also has implications for the degree of risk protection a short
position on synthetic securities provide. This protection increases with d. We thus
solve the securitization equilibrium and the portfolio decision when d = 1.15 × d∗,
or the face value is 15% greater than in the benchmark case.23 This change has
21Note that securitization affects the left tail of the distribution of returns and thus the fact we
use a constraint on the standard deviation instead of a constraint on the first percentile of losses
decreases the risk protection provided by securitization. This would be stronger for a standard
Value-at-Risk constraint, increasing the effects of securitization on risk premia.
22Setting d low is effectively the same as attempting to create AAA (safe) tranches, whose price
will then be insensitive to asymmetric information. Increasing d, for the same underlying asset,
generates lower rated tranches or riskier synthetic securities.
23That implies in this alternative equilibrium definition only (i), (ii) and (iv) are satisfied (see
definition of equilibrium at the beginning of section 3.3).
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two main effects. Firstly, as information asymmetry increases, securitization, or
more precisely q, decreases much faster than before (the synthetic security is more
sensitive to information). Secondly, in the event information asymmetries are low
(for Xn close to X0), and securitization volumes are high (since q is still high and PF
is higher24 due to higher d), the bank is able to relax the cash constraint significantly.
Additionally, as d is greater, the risk protection provided by F is greater and thus
the securitization effect on the bank’s risk constraint is stronger. As a result, in
this scenario securitization leads to larger bank balance sheets and even lower risk
premia. For the high information asymmetry case (for Xn close to X1), the effect
of lower q is too strong, limiting liquidity creation and thus curtailing balance sheet
expansion. Figure 9 shows our results.
Figure 9: Higher Face Value of Synthetic Security
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Higher Face Value of Synthetic Security (d) Benchmark
Finally, note that in our model all assets are transacted and matured in a single
period, hence securitization affects only the portfolio allocation in that period. Ho-
wever, as Adrian and Shin (2010) show, when assets held in the balance sheet (for
longer periods) increase in value, that implies a capital gain, which relaxes the risk
constraint next period, allowing banks to further increase asset holdings.25 Hence,
24Note that PF is higher but the expected return of a riskier security, given by E(d − PF ),
increases as d increases.
25A similar argument is also stressed by Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2012). They show
that asset revaluations and value-at-risk constraints effectively lead to banks becoming implicitly
less risk averse during periods where assets gain in value, generating lower risk premia and lower
volatility of asset prices. The mechanism that generates lower risk premia in our model does not
rely on the revaluation of bank equity/capital.
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an increase in securitization, which leads to a price increase of all assets due to hi-
gher demand, would lead to asset gains in banks’ portfolios, giving further strength
to balance sheet increases and further movements in risk premia in the following
periods through the revaluation of bank equity. This feedback mechanism might ex-
plain why we observed empirically that the securitization shock continues to affect
risk premia for a few periods after the initial shock.
Before we move on to the analysis of the key implications of altering the main
parameters of the model we take stock of the main features of our theoretical frame-
work that drive the results. Securitization volume is driven primarily by information
asymmetry and thus is orthogonal to asset prices. Due to idiosyncratic credit risk,
pooling is optimal, motivating the financial intermediary role in markets. Moreover,
due to information asymmetry, tranching is optimal and thus synthetic securities are
standard debt contracts. Securitization, due to its asset backing nature, is assumed
to be a cheaper form of funding relative to direct borrowing. Securitization, then,
leads to a relaxation of cash and risk constraints allowing banks to increase leverage
(recall that we empirically verify that securitization and asset holdings of financial
entities are positively linked). Banks are marginal price setters facing upward as-
set supply curves (thus, we implicitly assume some degree of market segmentations
exists) and have gains from asset diversification, and thus higher leverage leads to
higher demand of assets, generating higher prices and lower premia across different
asset classes. Consequently, higher volume of securitization leads to lower risk pre-
mia.
3.3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
We perform a number of sensitivity analysis to the parameter values used in the
benchmark model. Firstly, we increase the standard deviation of all assets (σ, σB,
σE). Secondly, we decrease the price sensitivity of bank demand for credit, bonds,
equity and bank borrowing, altering respectively (µ2, βB, βE and κ). Thirdly, we
alter the correlation structure of asset payoffs. In the first scenario we reverse the
sign of all correlations, so assets are all positively correlated, and in the second, we
reverse only the credit and equity correlation, leaving government bonds to be nega-
tively correlated to equity and credit. And finally, we decrease the risk aversion of
banks (higher χ). In all those cases the portfolio channel obtained in the benchmark
model remains, more securitization leads to lower risk premia. We discuss each of
these scenarios below. Figure 10 shows all the results.
High Variance of Assets
We start by presenting the results of the model with higher variance of assets.
First observe that as variances increase, the SPV is not able to create synthetic
securities that are as insensitive to information asymmetry as before, since, given
that Y n is more volatile, f is also more volatile for the range Xn > d. That implies
q is lower for any level of information asymmetry. Secondly, as the bank acquires
cash and relaxes the cash constraint, it increases asset holdings, which increases risk
taking, pushing the allocation closer to a binding risk constraint. Given the higher
asset risk, each unit of cash from securitization thus buys more risk than it did
in the benchmark case, making the risk constraint more likely to bind for smaller
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increases in asset holdings. Thus, the balance sheet multiplier of securitization is
lower, and consequently, risk premia do not fall as much as before. As we mentio-
ned the variance of a credit basket (σ) is related to the risk that is not diversified
away in a basket, or the correlation risk of credit assets. We thus conclude that this
correlation risk through its impact on securitization volumes, affect the level of risk
premia in the economy.
Low Price Sensitivity of Demand for Assets
We now look at the price sensitivity of demand. By assuming market demand
schedules (6), (7) we essentially assume that banks portfolio allocations affect the
price of assets or that banks (collectively) are the marginal pricer in the market for
assets. We decrease these sensitivities (for all assets, including for bank borrowing)
by 30%. This modification has two main effects. Firstly, when banks cannot use
securitization, they set a portfolio of assets that is funded by external borrowing in a
way that the cost of funding and the potential gain on assets is such that profits are
maximized. As funding costs do not increase as fast as before, bank’s utilize more
external borrowing and thus hold more assets (bigger balance sheet). As a result,
when securitization is allowed the bank is not as cash constrained as before, dimini-
shing the impact of securitization on the size of the balance sheet. Thus, the balance
sheet expansion as securitization is allowed is three percentage points smaller under
this case than in the benchmark model. Secondly, for any given increase in the de-
mand for equity and bonds, the resulting change in premia is smaller. Hence, under
this scenario bond and equity premia do not decrease as much as in the benchmark
case. Nonetheless, the introduction of securitization, due to its effect on cash and
risk constraints, leads to lower risk premia.
New Correlation Structure
We perform two sensitivity exercises as regards the correlation structure of re-
turns. In the first scenario, we reverse the sign of all correlations such that all assets
are positively correlated. In the second scenario we switch the sign of the correlation
between credit and equity only. When all correlations are positive, the ability of the
bank to maximize profits and abide by the risk constraint decreases since assets offer
less potential for diversification. As a result, without securitization the bank is very
constrained, using little external funding. That implies that when the risk constraint
is relaxed due to the ability to securitize credit, the balance sheet can be increased
further than in the benchmark case. However, due to the lower diversification role
performed by equity and bonds the balance sheet expansion is concentrated on the
safest asset, namely bonds. As a result bond premium decreases more than in the
benchmark case while equity premium decreases less. When equity and credit are
positively correlated, but bonds remain negatively correlated with the other assets,
then initial risk constraint is not as strict and thus balance sheet expansions after
securitization are smaller than when all correlations were positive. However, bonds
are not only the safest asset but also the best provider of diversification. Hence, in
scenario 2 bond premium decrease further while equity premium moves very little
when compared to scenario 1.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis
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High Variance of Assets Benchmark
(a) High Variance of Assets
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Asset Prices less Sensitive to Bank Demand Benchmark
(b) Low Price Sensitivity of Demand
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Reverse Sign of All Correlations Benchmark Reverse the Sign of Credit−Equity Correlations
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(c) Correlation Structure
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Laxer Bank Risk Constraint Benchmark
(d) Lower Bank Risk Aversion
Lower Bank Risk Aversion
Lastly, we look at the effect of decreasing bank risk aversion, or making the risk
constraint laxer, increasing χ by 30%. As expected we see that given a laxer risk
constraint, the introduction of securitization allows banks to increase their balance
sheets further than in the benchmark case. However, due to the additional risk
capacity available banks favor the riskier asset (but the one that pays higher return),
namely equity, over the safer asset, bonds. As a result, bond premium decreases only
slightly more compare to the benchmark case, while the equity premium decrease
is more substantial under lower risk aversion. Note that in the last three cases the
securitization market is not affected, since changes in risk aversion, covariance of
risk and price sensitivity of assets demand only affect the portfolio decision, hence
q is the same as the one in the benchmark case.
3.4. Extension
In the preceding analysis we assumed that the securitization market was inde-
pendent from the portfolio allocation of banks. Hence, if banks were to increase Qy,
that would not impact the securitization market, whose equilibrium was obtained
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for each unit of F or Qy. Implicitly, in the separating equilibrium of the market for
synthetic securities the final investors would absorb all securities the SPV auctions
as long as PF = E[f | Xn], or that the security price is equal to its expected value.
In this extension we modify the final investor market demand condition by assuming
that final investors require that
PF = E[F | Xn]− ξQy
where ξ > 0. Thus, under this market assumption, final investors would require
an increasing premium to hold a greater volume of synthetic security auctioned by
the SPV. We continue to solve the model by looking at the securitization decision
first and after that we obtain the portfolio decision. We simplify the securitization
decision by taking the security design as given, thus, we assume F = min(d, Y n)
for an exogenously fixed d. The securitization decision therefore only involves the
determination of the new separating equilibria
The Bayes-Nash separating equilibrium (q∗, P ∗F ) of the signalling game requires
that
• The solution q∗ is such that q∗ ∈ arg maxq∈[0,1] q(PF (q) − δf) almost surely,
and
• The price is P ∗F = f − ξQy almost surely
where f = E[f | X = Xn]
A separating equilibrium, assuming (1− δ)f > ξQy, is given by
q∗ =
(
f − ξQy/(1− δ)
f0 − ξQy/(1− δ)
)−1/(1−δ)
and P ∗F = f − ξQy (12)
with q∗ = 0 if (1− δ)f < ξQy. See the Appendix for the proof.
The key modification is that now q∗ = q(f, f0, Qy) and P ∗F = PF (f, f0, Qy) are
a function of Qy. Thus, the bank must take that into account when solving the
portfolio allocation. The portfolio returns are given by
ΠB | Xn = Qy(Y n − Py) + µ(Xn, Qy)Qy
+QB(VB − PB) +QE(VE − PE)− q(Qy)Qy(F − PF (Qy))−RFΥ
The portfolio problem is then given by
max
{Qy ,QB ,QE ,Υ}
E[ΠB | Xn] s.t.
QyPy +QBPB +QEPE 6 Γ0 + q(Qy)QyPF (Qy) + Υ
σΠB 6 χΓ0.
where
σΠB | Xn =
(
Q2yσ
2 +Q2Bσ
2
B +Q
2
Eσ
2
E + 2QyQBσyB + 2QyQEσyE + 2QBQEσEB
−2q(Qy)Q2yσFY − 2q(Qy)QyQBσFB − 2q(Qy)QyQEσFE + (q(Qy))2Q2yσ2F
)1/2
.
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Finally, the equilibrium of the model is then defined as the vector of asset alloca-
tions {Qy, QB, QE, Υ, q} and the vector of prices {µ, PB, PE, PF} such that (i) given
prices and q(Qy), {Qy, QB, QE,Υ} solves problem (11); (ii) given Qy, {q, PF} is a
separating equilibrium of the signalling game; and (iii) given {Qy, QB, QE}, prices
{µ, PB, PE} are consistent with the credit spread (mark-up), (5), and the market
demand schedules (6) and (7).
Figure 11: Risk Premia in Synthetic Security Market
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Price of F depend on Qy High Face Value
We select the same parameters as in the benchmark model but set F = min(d, Y n)
with d = 1.15×d(benchmark), or the benchmark model with higher d. Furthermore,
we set ξ = 0.0015 ensuring the condition for the separating equilibrium with posi-
tive q∗ holds. Figure 11 shows the results. We find that the share of securitization
in equilibrium is always smaller in the alternative model relative to the benchmark
model. The intuition for this result is as follows. In the benchmark model SPV has
to retain some securities to signal that their value (based on the private informa-
tion) is above its lower bound. This retention occurs as an optimal response in a
Walrasian market where the final investor is trying to ascertain he/she has acquired
all information related to the security payoff. Given that in the alternative model
the final investors require a premium to buy a security, implying a lower bid (for all
information states) than in the benchmark case, the optimal retention of the SPV to
avoid a further drop in prices is higher (selling synthetic securities became a worst
business relative to before). As a result, in a state where signals are good the SPV
would hold a bigger share of securities in equilibrium than when the price were equal
to its expected value. Naturally, when there is no information asymmetry, given that
the preference for cash is higher than the size of the premium, the SPV is willing to
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sell all securities thus q = 1 in both the benchmark and the alternative specification.
Smaller securitization volumes, as before, imply lower balance sheet expansion and
lower drops in asset risk premia. Also note that as a result of the premia paid in
the securitization market, bank profits are reduced in the extended model not only
due to lower balance sheet expansion but also due to the expected loss in the syn-
thetic security (effectively, the bank is now paying for the risk protection offered by
the synthetic security; note that when this price becomes too high the bank may
end up doing no securitization). We thus conclude that, if asymmetric information
problems exist, the compensation final investors require to bear synthetic securities
(tranch related) risk (ξ) influences the volume of securitization, affecting bond and
equity premia.
4. Discussion
We have shown that the pooling and tranching of assets held on the balance sheet
of financial companies not only creates liquidity, alleviating their cash constraint, but
also relaxes their risk constraint. Both of these effects allow banks to expand asset
holdings, increasing the importance of the sector that is more actively participating
in this market relative to the others in the economy (particularly households and
firms but also traditional commercial banks), and pushing asset prices up and risk
premia down. As a result, although the payoff outlook of assets has remained the
same, as do their risk profile, the compensation to undertaking risk in the economy
decreases. That way, one implication of our model is that increasing volumes of
securitization are associated with low risk premia.
In 2005, the Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked that although the short-
term interest rate had been increased by 150 basis points, long-term bond yields
had not followed suit, leading to a flat yield curve. This unanticipated behavior
of bond yields was characterized as a conundrum. Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu
(2006) and Backus and Wright (2007), amongst others, have looked at the main
causes of (relatively) too low bond yields. The general view is that this was due to a
fall in the term premium, probably associated with some combination of diminished
macroeconomic and financial market volatility. Our work provides a different chan-
nel driving the observed low (and persistent) levels of bond or term premia. The
period of 2003 - 2006 experienced a sharp and consistent increase in the volume of
ABS transacted in the US. That would have allowed banks to increase their asset
allocations, leading to a downward pressure on risk premia. We plot the levels of
securitization and the bond premium from yearly 2000 until October 2007.26 Bond
premium and volume of securitization are clearly strongly negatively correlated.27
In Aksoy and Basso (2014), we build a macroeconomic model linking term premia
with bank liquidity risk, showing how movements in term spread are linked to bank
portfolio choice, confirming the conclusion obtained here but employing a standard
26We smoothed the series (6 month cubic spline) to reflect the overall pattern. Note that we
perform a robustness test to exclude the period 2003-2006, eliminating the possibility that trends
are driving our empirical results. Moreover, our equity premium series does not display any trends.
27Note that our empirical results suggest this may not be due to decreased uncertainty or risk
perception given that the securitization effect on risk premium remains after controlling for a
measure of risk perception (vix).
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DSGE model.
Figure 12: ABS issuance versus Bond Premium
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During the same period, the first half of the 2000’s, Rajan (2005) also pointed out
that current practices in financial intermediation may be a source of shifting risks,
but stressed they remained in the system. He focuses particularly on the incentives of
bank managers as a driving force in this process. In our model, managers maximize
returns using synthetic instruments to increase liquidity creation and to shift some
risks to final investors. That allows them to increase asset positions that depressed
risk premia in the economy. Nonetheless, the risk profile of the assets remained
the same, thus as our model suggests, the compensation for risk is lower (perhaps
decreasing the general perception of risk) but the actual volatility of payoffs remained
the same.
Another implication of our results is to highlight the importance of looking at
financial intermediation, as well as final investors, to increase our understanding of
the dynamic movements in asset prices. Many advances in asset pricing (particularly
the ones linked to the macroeconomic literature) have focused on different forms of
a consumption Euler equation, linking volatility of asset prices with consumption or
final investors decision. Recent studies, however, point to the importance of finan-
cial intermediation. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) look at the relevance of capital
constraints, particularly during financial crises, in making financial intermediaries
be the marginal investors in the market, and hence setting risk premia. Our results
show that financial intermediaries’ balance sheets can be important in asset pricing
even when banking capital is held constant and is not a direct concern. Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2014), like us, also look more generally at the link between finan-
cial intermediation and asset pricing. They show that single factor models using
shocks to the leverage of security brokers and dealers perform as well as multifac-
tor models in pricing equity and bond portfolios. Instead of looking directly at
the growth of assets, our work attempts to look closely at the portfolio choice of
financial intermediaries to try to establish the main channels through which their
activity influence asset prices. We find that the usage of pooling and tranching of
credit assets to be a crucial activity allowing banks to relax both their cash and risk
constraints, making them the marginal investor in pricing not only credit but also
equity and bonds.
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As a result, the link between intermediation and asset prices is directly related
to the drivers of the volume of securitization in the economy. The key driver of
securitization in the DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1999) framework, employed here, is the
degree of asymmetric information.28 Focusing on informational issues also allow
us to stress the optimality of pooling and tranching, key components behind the
portfolio mechanism we propose. However, the benchmark model and the extension
presented also identify other drivers of the volume of securitization, while holding
asymmetric information constant. Firstly, we observe that as the remaining risk of
credit baskets (the correlation amongst individual credit instruments or the aggre-
gate risk, denoted by η in our model) increases, synthetic securities become more
information sensitive and thus final investors are less willing to hold a greater frac-
tion of the tranches created. Secondly, if synthetic securities, due to its potential
risks, must offer a premium for its holders (extension in section 3.4), the higher
the premium, the lower the volume of securitization. Thus, if agents required lower
(higher) compensation to undertake the risk embedded into those tranches,29 due to
for instance, misunderstanding of the risks involved in triple AAA synthetic secu-
rities (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009)), due to institutional investors’ sentiment
(Ivashina and Sun (2011)) or due to miscalculation of the probability of rare events
(Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2010)), then levels of securitization will be higher
(lower).30 Therefore, securitization volumes may vary due to the fluctuations in the
degree of information asymmetry, in the (mis) perceived credit basket riskiness or in
the compensation to undertake tranche related risk (which are unrelated to equity
and bond markets). As long as pooling and tranching is done, allowing banks to
relax cash and risk constraints, the portfolio mechanism highlighted here will link
variations in securitization to bond and equity premia.31
Our model took the degree of information asymmetry as given and provided a
solution whereby in equilibrium all agents become aware of all information while pri-
28In order to verify the link between the volume of securitization and degree of information
asymmetry, validating DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1999) framework, we would require data on the
degree of asymmetric information or the “forced” retention of synthetic assets on the balance sheet
of financial intermediaries during the securitization process. Neither variable is available in our
dataset. In a market outcome, if retention is not done, PF , the price of the security at the auction
day, must decrease. Deal prices are available in our sample, and thus we construct a monthly price
discount variable given by
∑
tranches(100−PF )×(Face V alue of tranch)/V olume Securitization
for each month. Another implication of the model is that the lower d (the safer the tranches), the
higher q will be, implying potentially higher volumes of securitization. We thus calculate the ratio
of AAA rated tranches to the total volume of securitization per month. We regress these two
variables on the volume of securitization (we are only after correlation, not being able to establish
causality). We find that both variables are significant and as expected the higher the price discount,
the lower the total amount of securitization (measured as face value) and the higher the ratio of
triple AAA rated tranches, the higher the volume of securitization. Results are available from the
authors upon request.
29This movement in compensation must be orthogonal to the risk compensation require to hold
equities and bonds.
30There is evidence these factors played an important role in the surge of securitization during
the 2003 - 2007 period (Chernenko, Hanson, and Sunderam (2013)).
31Note also that although our model is static, the main mechanism highlighted here can also
carry through in a dynamic model where the main drivers of securitization, namely, the degree
of information asymmetry, credit basket riskiness and compensation to undertake tranche related
risk, vary through time.
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cing the credit basket. However, we note that the incentives for bank managers is to
increase actual information asymmetry, since that way they obtain better conditions
in the origination of credit assets (loans) but would like to decrease the “perceived”
information asymmetry when compared to final investors in the distribution mar-
ket. That way they would maximize the liquidity creation of the securities on their
balance sheet. This might have generated strong conflict of interests between the
different divisions in large financial corporations. That would be particularly the
case since these institutions not only participate in the origination and distribution
of assets, but also act as final investors (through different funds) and investment
advisors for final investors.32 Thus, modeling the acquisition of information and
the agency problems involved are then crucial to understand the risk implications
of securitization and bank portfolio choices. Building on the framework discussed
here, one interesting (but potentially cumbersome) extension would be to relax the
assumption that X0 (the lower bound of the information set) is common knowledge,
incorporating a signal extraction mechanism that opens the possibility of misinfor-
mation. For instance, Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2013) document that buyers
received false information about the true quality of assets in contractual disclosures
by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages.
Finally, our theoretical model, by looking at the portfolio choice of financial en-
tities, provides a rationale for the empirically observed link between securitization
and asset prices. An alternative explanation is that deeper securitization markets,
by introducing new assets in the economy, provide additional insurance instruments
previously unavailable, depressing risk premia. However, while volumes of securi-
tization have trended positively from 1993 until the crisis, we do not observe such
trends in bond and equity premia. Moreover, Simsek (2013) shows that under he-
terogenous believes, financial innovation or the introduction of new assets, due to
enhanced speculation motives, may push risk premium up, offsetting the insurance
effect. Nonetheless, other mechanisms explaining the link between securitization
and asset prices might also be at play.
5. Final Remarks
The volume of transactions in the securitization market has increased substan-
tially since the beginning of the 90’s. Using a monthly dataset of asset-backed
securities (ABS) and mortgage backed securities (MBS) transactions in the US we
find that increases in the volume of ABS transacted affect both the bond and the
equity premium. This effect is not related to aggregate risk nor the link between vo-
lume traded and economic or asset payoff outlook. Thus, the empirical results point
to the relationship between financial intermediation and asset prices. Consequently,
we build a model that focuses particularly on the portfolio choice of banks when
securitization of credit assets held on the balance sheet is feasible. We show that an
increase in securitization leads to lower equity and bond premia since creating and
selling synthetic securities relaxes both the cash and the risk constraints of banks.
32This conflict of interest might have been manifested in the last crisis. For instance, reports
suggest that “JPMorgan Chase & Co said it routinely overstated the quality of mortgages it was
selling to investors, and it agreed to pay 13 billion USD to settle related charges with the U.S.
government, federal officials said on Tuesday.” (Reuters (Nov. 19, 2013))
34
Thus, the key variables to understand the link between financial intermediation and
asset prices are the main drivers of securitization volumes, namely degree of asym-
metric information, pricing of the correlation risk of credit baskets and assessment
of the final investors compensation for undertaking tranche related risk.
A number of different extensions to our framework, both empirically and theo-
retically, may prove to be fruitful research projects. First, looking at micro bank
data, particularly at portfolio compositions during periods of high volume of ABS
and MBS issuance might clarify the main channel, which was explored here only at
the aggregate level. Second, our model characterized a partial equilibrium of bank
portfolio choice. Extending the framework to a general equilibrium model, which
also incorporates some form of market segmentation, is important to understand
the effects of this process to other asset holders. Our results point to importance
of information asymmetry between intermediaries and final investors. Studying the
information acquisition process of credit basket’s payoff and risk (correlation of in-
dividual credit assets) may improve our understanding of the effects of financial
intermediation on asset prices. Finally, Chabakauri (2014) provides an analytical
survey on the differential effects of borrowing and short sale constraints and limited
participation on asset prices in an environment where final investors have heteroge-
nous preferences and beliefs. Extending our framework to incorporate final investor
constraints may be relevant to explore the impact of securitization on asset prices.
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Appendix A. Robustness of Empirical Results
1.1. Benchmark
Benchmark - Sample Period 01/1993 until 12/2002
This sample excludes the boom period of securitization occurred from 2003 until
the financial crisis. The VAR specification remains unchanged.
Impulse responses for bond premium and equity premium obtained are very
similar to the benchmark case, however, the contribution of a securitization shock
in explaining FEV of bond and equity premia decreases from around 6 - 7%, observed
in the benchmark case, to around 3 - 4%.
Benchmark - Sample Period 01/2009 until 09/2013
This estimation allows us to analysis the link between securitization and asset
prices in the post-crisis period. The VAR specification remains unchanged.
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Figure 13: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model - Sample Period 01/1993 until
12/2002
Term Spread
2 4 6 8 10
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Bond Premium
2 4 6 8 10
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
x 10−3 Equity Premium
2 4 6 8 10
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
ABS Shock
01/1993 −
12/2002
Figure 14: Impulse Responses - Parsimonious Model - Sample Period 01/2009 until
09/2013
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Impulse responses for bond premium and equity premium obtained are somewhat
similar to the benchmark case. We find that a securitization shock contributes in
explaining around 6% of FEV in excess bond return and around 5% of FEV in excess
market return, similar to what we obtained in the benchmark case.
Robustness Check on Identification We perform two robustness check on our
recursive identification assumption. Firstly we reverse the order of the securitization
variable putting it last in the vector of variables, thus all asset prices can only
respond to securitization with a lag. Secondly, we obtain the contemporaneous
response of securitization to shocks in spreads, excess bond and market returns,
verifying whether reverse causality was a possibility. Change the ordering only
affects the negative movement observed for spreads in the benchmark estimation.
Reverse causality does not seem to occur, or securitization does not respond to
shocks to risk premia or the only statistically significant response is positive.
Figure 15: Impulse Responses - Reverse Ordering
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Figure 16: Impulse Responses - ABS response to asset price shocks
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1.2. Quarterly Data
We now turn to the results of the estimations using quarterly data. The main
reason to use this frequency is that we can then control for the asset holdings of
security brokers and dealers, which other studies have shown to be important in
explaining asset prices. The first figure below shows the estimations when either
securitization or asset holdings is included in the VAR. The second figure shows the
impulse responses to a securitization shock when both variables are included in the
VAR. We observe that controlling for asset growth of these financial institutions does
not altered the explanatory power of securitization and that a shock to securitization
leads to a sharp increase in asset holdings, supporting the portfolio link explored in
the theoretical model.
Figure 17: Impulse Responses - Quarterly Frequency - Securitization vs Asset Hol-
dings of Sec. Brokers
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Figure 18: Impulse Responses - Quarterly Frequency - Securitization and Asset
Holdings of Sec. Brokers
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1.3. Predictive Regressions
Table 2: Predictive Regressions (OLS Estimates 1993M1-2007M11)
spread xbr xr
dABSt−1 −0.0115 −0.0015 −0.2247
dABSt−2 0.0627 −0.0024∗ −0.3718∗∗
dABSt−3 −0.0458 −0.0002 −0.2807
dABSt−4 −0.1776∗∗ −0.0018 0.1259
rpdt−1 −1.5549 0.0185 1.3005
rpdt−2 −1.2749 −0.0233 −3.2139
rpdt−3 1.8857 0.0011 1.6579
rpdt−4 0.9081 0.0036 0.2732
spreadt−1 0.9497∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.2499
spreadt−2 −0.2746∗∗ −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.2934
spreadt−3 0.3544∗∗∗ 0.0011 −0.114
spreadt−4 −0.0696 −0.0008 0.2041
xbrt−1 3.7802 0.9335∗∗∗ −23.1635∗∗
xbrt−2 −4.4753 0.1566 22.3724
xbrt−3 −1.3059 −0.0332 3.7552
xbrt−4 −1.938 −0.0926 −13.1742
xrt−1 −0.0582 0.0022∗∗ 0.0612
xrt−2 −0.1647∗ 0.0003 −0.0823
xrt−3 −0.1608∗ −0.0009 −0.1122
xrt−4 0.0702 0.0006 −0.0639
realr 3mt−1 0.01 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0388
realr 3mt−2 −0.3682∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0043
realr 3mt−3 0.1685 −0.001 −0.3308
realr 3mt−4 0.1744 0.0015 0.3195∗
R2 0.9161 0.9372 0.166
n.o.b. 175 175 175
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10,5,1 percent, respectively.
Appendix B. Risk Profile of the Synthetic Asset F
In this appendix we show the details of the derivation of the variance of asset F
and its covariance with the other three assets, namely, the credit basket, government
bonds and equity.
The variance of F is given by
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σ2F =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F − E[F | Xn])2f(η)dη =
∫ ∞
−∞
(min(d,Xn + η)− E[F | Xn])2f(η)dη
σ2F =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)2f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
d2f(η)dη − (fd)2
σ2F = (Xn)2Φ(
d−Xn
σ )−2Xnσφ( d−X
n
σ )−σ2[ d−X
n
σ
φ( d−X
n
σ )−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]+d2[1−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]−(fd)2
The covariance between the synthetic asset F and the credit basket Y n is given
by
σFy =
∫ ∞
−∞
(F − E[F | Xn])(Xn + η −Xn)f(η)dη =
∫ ∞
−∞
min(d,Xn + η)(Xn + η)f(η)dη
σFy =
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)2f(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
d(Xn + η)f(η)dη − fdXn
σFy = (Xn)2Φ( d−X
n
σ )−2Xnσφ( d−X
n
σ )−σ2[ d−X
n
σ
φ( d−X
n
σ )−Φ( d−X
n
σ )]
+d[Xn(1−Φ( d−Xnσ ))+σφ( d−X
n
σ )]−fdXn
The covariance between the synthetic asset F and equity (where f(η, VE) is the
joint density function of the aggregate credit risk and the equity risk) is given by
σFE =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
min(d,Xn + η)VEf(η, VE)dηdVE
σFE =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ (d−Xn)
−∞
(Xn + η)VEf(η)dη +
∫ ∞
(d−Xn)
VE(X
n + η)f(η)dη − fdXn
Due to the multivariate density function we can not obtain analytical solutions.
However, note that F = Y n if η < d−Xn and is constant otherwise, thus we use
σFE ≈ Prob(η < d−Xn)σEy = Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σEy
Using the same argument σFB ≈ Prob(η < d−Xn)σBy = Φ
(
d−Xn
σ
)
σBy.
Appendix C. Accuracy of Optimization and Linear Inter-
polation
All results reported in the section 3 are smoothed due to potential accuracy
problems in the numerical solution of the portfolio optimization problem. We find as
we changeXn fromX0 toX1 the portfolio solution for the case when no securitization
is allowed does not change. However, in some cases a small change in Xn result in
a more sizable movement in the portfolio allocations. This may be due to the fact
that the lagrangian of the optimization problem is very insensitive to small changes
to the portfolio holdings as Xn changes. As a result, the optimization routine finds
it optimal to maintain asset holdings fixed, increasing external funding (Υ) only
to satisfy the cash constraint (recall that Py increases as X
n increases) leaving the
other constraint (risk) unaffected. As Xn continues to increase, a re-balancing is
finally optimal under the accuracy used by the optimization routine and the portfolio
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allocations change. This produces a stepwise solution to portfolio holdings for the
model without securitization. This does not occur with the model with securitization
since Xn affects q leading to changes in both constraints and the objective function
when Xn changes. In order to smooth the portfolio choice, possibly correcting
for accuracy problems, we interpolate linearly the solutions across Xn. Figure 13
displays the raw solution and the linearly interpolated solutions for the Benchmark
model. Note that this does not affect the main conclusions of our model.
Figure 19: Accuracy and Linear Interpolation
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
−0.41
−0.4
−0.39
−0.38
−0.37
−0.36
−0.35
−0.34
−0.33
−0.32
Bond Premium − %Change
Information Asymmetry
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
−0.37
−0.36
−0.35
−0.34
−0.33
−0.32
−0.31
−0.3
Equity Premium − %Change
Information Asymmetry
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
Balance Sheet − %Change
Information Asymmetry
 
 
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
Bond Holdings
Information Asymmetry
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
1
1.5
2
2.5
Equity Holdings
Information Asymmetry
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Credit Holdings
Information Asymmetry
 
 
Raw Corrected for Accuracy
Model with Sec Model No Sec − Linear Model No Sec − Raw
Appendix D. Separating Equilibrium - Extension
Under the alternative specification for the market demand the monotonicity of q∗,
as well as the single crossing property, shown in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), continue
to hold. Thus, to ensure q∗ is optimal we need only check the first-order condition
of the informed agent’s optimization problem (see DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) for
details). The first order condition of the SPV (assuming interior solution) is
q
dP ∗F
dq
+ (P ∗F − δf) = 0
Substituting for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium condition (ii) gives
dP ∗F
dq
+
(1− δ)
q
P ∗F =
δfξQy
q
The separating equilibrium is given by a the solution to this differential equation
with the boundary condition that P ∗F (1) = f0 − ξQy. Note that if (1 − δ)f < ξQy
then it is optimal to SPV to set q∗ = 0 for all Xn (in this case the solution to SPV
problem is not interior).
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